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Due  to  the  increasing  discussion  about  liberalisation  in  the  piped  water 
industry  municipal  authorities  in  several  European  countries  consider 
modifications  of  their  water  utilities’  structure  such  as  legal  constitution, 
business  objectives  or  private  participation.  The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to 
evaluate the extent to which it is socially optimal to compose water utilities as 
welfare  or  profit  maximising  companies  when  assuming  the  introduction  of 
competition in the market based on common carriage – as applied in England 
and  Wales.  Using  a  game  theoretic  model  of  mixed  oligopolies  that  contains 
water markets specificities we show that welfare tends to be higher in a regime, 
where utilities are instructed to maximise profits rather than welfare.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Privatisation  and  liberalisation  in  the  piped  water  industry  are  not  very 
popular.  Opponents  of  such  processes  fear  that  private  companies  rather 
optimise short term profits instead of long-term welfare (see WWF 2003 or BMZ 
2001). According to a poll almost the entire Austrian population defeats any 
privatisation  steps  in  the  piped  water  sector.  The  German  city  of  Potsdam 
retracted the water utility privatisation in 2000 since it feared increasing water 
and waste water fees (see Schoenbaeck et al. 2003, p. 1 and 391). And in several 
Swiss  municipalities  the  public  voted  against  formal  privatisation  which 
intended  to  adjust  the  water  utilities’  legal  constitution.  The  concerns  about 
privatisation  and  liberalisation  might  root  in  the  fact  that  water  supply  is 
widely seen as a natural monopoly. Hence, it tends be socially optimal to run a 
water monopoly as public welfare maximising utility instead of a private profit 
maximising  company.  In  fact  private  participation  in  Europe  is  not  very 
developed,  water  supply  is  usually  provided  by  municipal  authorities  (see 
Schoenbaeck  et.  al.,  2003  or  EEB,  2002).  Extended  subsidies  from  local 
governments  indicate  rather  welfare  than  profit  maximisation  in  the  piped 
water sector (see Gordon-Walker and Marr 2002, p. 31).1 However, due to recent 
changes in the European legislation one can expect an increasing discussion 
about liberalisation. Before 2000 the European Community (EC) excluded the 
water industry from its competition law – in contrast to other network utilities 
such  as  postal  services,  gas  or  electricity.  Today,  water  services  are  neither 
explicitly  included  nor  excluded  in  the  EC  competition  law.  Nevertheless,  in 
their report for the attention of the European Commission Gordon-Walker and 
Marr  (2002)  follow,  “there  is  considerable  scope  of  application  of  the  EC 
competition rules to increase competition in the water sector”. 
Considering  the  introduction  of  competition  it  might  be  useful  to  re-
evaluate  water  utilities’  objectives.  In  a  competitive  environment  it  could  be 
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appropriate to change the utility’s legal structure for instance into to a public 
limited company and/or to enhance private participation. Obviously such steps 
tend  to  change  the  utility’s  objective  from  a  welfare  to  a  rather  profit 
maximising approach. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the extent to 
which  it  is  socially  optimal  to  compose  water  utilities  as  welfare  or  profit 
maximising when considering the introduction of competition. Such competition 
can be introduced in two ways: competition for the market and competition in 
the market.2 We focus the latter, which corresponds to the common carriage 
approach  that is used in the water market in England  and Wales. Common 
carriage is basically equivalent to interconnection that has already been applied 
in  several  other  network  industries  such  as  telecommunication,  gas  or 
electricity.  Using  a  game  theoretic  model  of  mixed  oligopolies  that  contains 
water markets specificities this paper reveals the surprising result that welfare 
tends to be higher in a regime, where the utilities are instructed to maximise 
profits rather than welfare. 
There is a broad literature about mixed oligopolies, which describes the 
effects  of  different  governance  structures  in  oligopoly  competition.  Early 
literature assumes competition between a public welfare maximising company 
and private profit maximising companies, where the public company acts as a 
Stackelberg leader – see Bös (1986), Rees (1984) or Hagen (1979). The authors 
of this so called “second best analysis literature” investigate how the public firm 
should deviate from marginal cost pricing in order to maximise welfare. Harris 
and Wiens (1980) assume a dominant public firm that is able to announce its 
output policy to the private firms that react to this policy. With such setting 
they show how the dominant government firm can impose a first-best allocation 
of resources within the industry. The public firm announces that it will make 
up  any  quantity  difference  between  the  competitive  output  and  the  private 
firms output. As a result the private firms face a given market price – now it is 
optimal  to  equalise  marginal  costs  and  price.  However,  there  is  no  serious 
justification for a public Stackelberg leadership. Beato and Mas-Colell (1984) 
                                                            
2 For an overview about common carriage implemented in England and Wales see for instance  Cowan (1997), 
Cowan (1993) or Webb and Erhardt (1998). For an overview about franchise bidding in France see for instance 
Clark and Mondello (2000) or Elnaboulsi (2001) or Furrer (2004). 4 
changed the roles of the firms. In their duopoly model they assume a reverse 
model structure, where the public firm takes as given the private company’s 
output.  They  show  that  welfare  may  be  higher  than  under  the  assumptions 
made in the second best literature. De Fraja and Delbono (1989) extend the 
analysis by assuming different settings, where the public and the private firms 
play simultaneously or not. They show that welfare is higher in a pure oligopoly 
where the public firm acts as profit maximising company than when the public 
firm is welfare maximising. If the public firm has the Stackelberg leadership it 
is always optimal to set the price above marginal costs. Cremer et al. (1989) 
extend  this  analysis  and  ask  whether  it  is  socially  optimal  to  have  a  public 
welfare maximising company in a Cournot oligopoly, and if so, how many public 
firms are socially wanted. Their analysis contains several different assumptions 
such as increasing returns to scale (based on fixed and variable costs), public 
firms’ budget constraints or wage differences between public and private firms. 
However,  from  their  analysis  no  clear  answer  emerges.  De  Fraja  (1991) 
introduced  a  model  that  contains  competition  between  a  less  efficient  public 
firm  and  more  efficient  private  firms.  He  shows  that  the  presence  of  the 
relatively  inefficient  public  firm  with  no  budget  constraint  may  enhance  the 
overall efficiency, since the lower market price stimulates the private producers 
to improve their efficiency. Fjell and Pal (1996) examine mixed oligopolies in the 
context of international competition. In their model a state-owned public firm 
competes  with  both  domestic  and  foreign  private  firms.  They  show  that  the 
public firm reduces its market engagement in case of the entrance of a domestic 
private  firm.  And  they  show  that  the  entrance  of  the  domestic  private  firm 
enhance  welfare,  whereas  entrance  of  foreign  firms  may  enhance  or  reduce 
(domestic) welfare.  
The model in this paper follows the mixed oligopoly literature, where the 
public and the private firm simultaneously decide about production quantities 
in  a  Cournot  oligopoly.  We  extend  the  existing  settings  by  taking  the 
specificities of a network competition in the piped water industry into account. 
The applied common carriage model basically corresponds to a model designed 
by Foellmi and Meister (2004). The potential market entrant can be assumed as 5 
a neighboured water utility that connects its own with the incumbent’s network 
physically. The incumbent applies an access fee for the use of its infrastructure 
– similar to the interconnection price in the telecommunication industry. The 
model  is  basically  designed  as  a  three  stage  game.  At  the  first  stage,  an 
incumbent A in market 1 and the potential market entrant B decide about their 
objective  function:  welfare  or  profit  maximisation.  In  a  second  stage  the 
incumbent  or  a  regulator  decides  about  the  access  fee  –  depending  on  the 
applied regulation regime. In the third stage the incumbent and the market 
entrant  decide  about  production  quantities.  The  model  shows,  that  welfare 
tends  to  be  higher  in  a  profit  maximisation  regime,  in  particular  when 
assuming significant efficiency differentials between the incumbent A and the 
entering  water  supplier  B.  The  reason  is  obvious:  welfare  maximisation 
enhances A’s output but reduces B’s engagement incentives in market 1. Hence, 
welfare  maximisation  increases  consumer  surplus  compared  to  the  profit 
maximisation regime but reduces A’s profit due to a lower retail price, reduced 
access  income  and  reduced  overall  production  efficiency.  The  net  effect  on 
welfare in market 1 tends to be negative. By the introduction of access price 
regulation the degree of competition in market 1 can be enhanced. However, the 
model shows that welfare in the incumbent’s municipality does not necessarily 
benefit from regulation. 
First the paper explains the water market’s specificities that have to be 
considered when designing a model of common carriage. Section 2.2 examines 
the model’s basic settings and the players’ objective functions. In Section 2.3 we 
analyse the players’ interactions based on a general demand function. Section 3 
introduces a linear model that allows to calculate and to compare welfare in the 
different regimes explicitly. 
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2 The model 
 
2.1 Water market specificities  
 
When  designing  a  competition  model  based  on  common  carriage  one  has  to 
consider several technical aspects concerning the piped water industry. First, 
water  networks  are  not  expected  to  generate  any  network  externalities: 
consumer  X  does  not  profit  directly  from  the  existence  of  any  additional 
consumer  Y  connected  to  the  same  network3.  Secondly,  water  networks  are 
assumed  to  be  one-way  networks,  since  water  suppliers  do  not  receive  any 
direct and network based feedback from their customers (see Economides 2000, 
p. 4). Thirdly, the geographical extension of water networks is expected to be 
regional  or  even  local  due  to  transport  costs  arising  from  pumping 
requirements  and  water  quality  losses  that  increase  with  the  transport 
distance (see BMWi 2001, p. 24). Additionally there are limitations of mixing 
different  water  qualities  in  one  network  since  it  raises  the  possibility  of 
leaching and corrosion of pipes, sedimentation and suspension of particles and 
it affects microbial quality (see Kurukulasauiya 2001, p. 24). Obviously these 
specificities  hinder  the  geographical  extension  of  a  common  carriage 
competition  in  the  water  industry:  Transport  costs  on  the  one  side  and  the 
limitations of mixing different water qualities on the other side significantly 
limit  the  opportunity  of  connecting  neighboured  water  networks.  One  can 
follow that competition is expected to occur only between a restricted number of 
neighboured water suppliers. The geographic extension of a competition based 
on common carriage in the piped water industry tends to be regional or even 
local and not very intense.  
  The basic setting of this model follows Foellmi and Meister (2004), since 
they consider the above described aspects in their water network competition 
model that analyses the effects of common carriage. They assume that only two 
neighboured water utilities A and B connect their pipe networks 1 and 2. The 
                                                            
3 Obviously the existence of Y in the network does not change X’s utility directly. However, X might profit 
from indirect effects, such us economies of scale.   7 
physical connection allows A and B to exchange treated water resources within 
their  networks.  As  a  result,  the  connection  allows  A  to  serve  customers 
connected to B’s network 2 and it allows B to serve customers connected to A’s 
network 1. Obviously the introduction of such competition requires an access 
regime that allows the utilities to use their competitor’s pipe network to supply 
customers with treated water. Foellmi and Meister (2004) forego designing an 
explicit access regime with regulated access prices. They argue that in practice 
the regulation of access prices in the water sector tends to be difficult due to 
the  high  number  of  different  water  networks  and  the  variance  of  networks 
costs. The argumentation is based on Cowan’s (1997, p. 91) critique, that the 
regulatory burden of assessing access prices for different companies’ networks 
would be large. In fact, the regulator Ofwat in England and Wales does not 
explicitly regulate access charges ex ante. Obviously such lack of regulation 
causes the danger of inexistent competition. Without any ex ante regulation A 
can charge a sufficient high access price in order to prevent the more efficient 
B’s access and to defend its monopoly position. Nevertheless, one can show that 
under certain circumstances voluntary access can occur even in an unregulated 
regime.  Such  voluntary  access  requires  differentials  in  marginal  treatment 
costs. A less efficient utility A with higher marginal treatment costs than its 
competitor B has incentives to allow third party access and therefore to admit 
competition. By allowing access A is able to reduce own production quantity 
and  therefore  production  costs.  The  reduced  income  can  be  compensated  by 
charging an access fee. In fact, marginal treatment costs differ significantly 
between water suppliers – even between neighboured water utilities. Foellmi 
and Meister assume that the involved water utilities A and B are both profit 
maximising  private  companies.  However,  in  practice  it  is  rather  assumable, 
that water utilities are owned by the public – usually by the municipalities. 
Utilities are therefore not assumed to be exclusively profit maximising. They 
rather  face  an  objective  function  that  maximises  the  relevant  community’s 
welfare.  The  following  model  considers  this  issue  by  changing  the  utilities’ 
objective functions. We compare two different regimes: the incumbent is profit 8 
maximising  or  welfare  maximising.  Additionally  the  model  accounts  for  two 
different access price regulation systems: unregulated and regulated access.  
 
2.2 The general setting 
 
The model is basically designed as a three stage game. Since the determination 
of the governance structure can be seen as very long term oriented, we assume 
that  utilities  decide  in  stage  0  about  their  objective  functions.  Given  the 
governance structures and therefore their objective functions A and B decide in 
the  following  stages  about  short  term  variables.  In  case  of  an  unregulated 
access  price  regime  (as  assumed  by  Foellmi  and  Meister)  the  incumbent  A 
decides in stage 1 about the access price a1. In case of a regulated regime, it is a 
regulatory agency that decides about a1. In such regulated case, the access price 
is  exogenously  given  in  the  model.  Since  we  assume  a  Cournot  Duopoly  the 
incumbent  A  and  the  (potential)  market  entrant  B  decide  in  a  second  stage 
simultaneously  about  their  engagement  in  market  1.  Given  A’s  governance 
structure and the relevant access price a1 they decide simultaneously about the 
quantities they want to sell to customers connected to A’s network 1. We denote 
A’s  production  quantity  sold  to  the  customers  in  network  1  as  q1A  and  B’s 
production  quantity  for  customers  in  network  1  as  q1B.  Total  water  sold  to 
customers in market 1 amounts to q1 = q1A + q1B. The inverse demand function 
in market 1 is given as p1(q1). The general time frame of the model can therefore 








Figure 1 : Time frame of the model 
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about q1A and q1B9 
Water treatment and pumping requirements causes variable costs Cj(·), j Î {A, 
B}. Since not relevant in our optimisation problem we can omit fixed costs such 
as network investment and maintenance. As mentioned above, one can assume 
that – even neighboured – water utilities face different marginal costs. In our 
model we assume that A is less efficient than be. As a result, A faces higher 
marginal treatment costs than its competitor B, CA’ > CB’. Obviously we analyse 
the  case,  where  A  has  incentives  to  open  its  market  for  B.  Additionally  we 
assume  that  the  more  efficient  utility  B  does  not  face  any  relevant  capacity 
constraints, marginal costs are therefore assumed to be constant, CB’ = cB. Such 
assumption eases the analysis, since we do not have to consider impacts on B’s 
behaviour in its own network 2.  
After  determining  the  time  frame  and  the  model’s  variables,  one  can 
define  the  suppliers’  objective  functions.  First  let  us  determine  A’s  objective 
function under the assumption of profit maximisation. Such objective function 
exactly corresponds to the one used by Foellmi and Meister (2004, p. 9):  
 
) ( ) ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 A A B A A q C q a q q p - + = P                            (1), 
 
where ПA denotes A’s profit and p1 the retail prices in market 1. Obviously A 
does not only generate earnings from selling water quantity q1A to customers 
connected to network 1. Additionally A can generate income from allowing B 
access to the network 1. The relevant income is given by the term a1 q1B. B’s 
objective function in a profit maximising regime can be defined as follows:  
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where p2 denotes the retail price in market 2. We solve the model by backwards 
induction. Therefore we derive the players’ first order conditions regarding their 
production quantities q1A and q1B given the access price a1:  
 10 
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where  ) ( ' / ) ( / ) ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 q p q p q p B A º ¶ × ¶ = ¶ × ¶ . We do not have to consider B’s first order 
condition regarding q2B, since we exclusively analyse market 1. And since we 
assumed linear costs cB the profit maximising production quantity q2B does not 
vary with an increased or reduced q1B. Assuming an unregulated access price 
regime, the incumbent A sets the access price a1 in stage 1 as follows:  
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where  the  quantity  reaction  of  B,  1 1 /da dq B ,  can  be  determined  by  the  total 
differentiation of equation (4). It is given by  
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where  0 ) ( ' 2 ) ( ' ' 1 1 1 1 1 < + q p q p q B , in a profit maximum. Note that in a regime where 
the access price a1 is determined by a public regulatory agency, equations (5) 
and (6) would be irrelevant, since a1 can be seen as exogenous. In such regime, 
the access price in equation (4) would be exogenously given at  1 a .  
However, public water utilities might pursue additional objectives beside 
profit. We can assume that a public firm rather maximise welfare than profit. 
Such extension basically corresponds to the mixed oligopoly model designed by 
Fraja  and  Delbono  (1989),  where  a  public  firm  competes  in  a  Cournot 
competition model with private profit maximising companies. However, in such 
a  setting  A  would  not  only  maximise  the  sum  of  the  own  profit  and  the 11 
consumer surplus in market 1, additionally A would consider its neighbour’s 
profit. One might concern that such objective function is not appropriate in our 
model,  where  a  domestic  public  firm  competes  with  foreign  companies.  A 
municipal  owned  water  utility  should  exclusively  concern  about  domestic 
welfare: consumer surplus in its municipality and profit which can be allocated 
to the own municipal financial statement. Such extension was made by Pal and 
White (1998) who analyse an international mixed oligopoly with one domestic 
public firm and a number of n foreign private firms. We adapt their idea and 
define A’s objective function as follows: 
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Using such objective function A maximises the sum of the consumer surplus in 
market 1 and the own profit. Of course we could allow B to change its objective 
function as well. 
 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
0
2 2 2 2
2
B B B B B B B B B
q
B B q q c q a q q p q p q q q p dq q p W
B
+ - - + + - = ∫       (8), 
 
where q2B denotes B’s production quantity for customers connected to network 
2. A’s engagement in market 2 must be zero in equilibrium, therefore q2 = q2B. 
Note, from A’s perspective nothing changes compared to a regime where B faces 
a profit maximisation objective function. Since B maximises domestic welfare in 
market (or municipality) 2, it maximises the sum of domestic consumer surplus, 
the profit from market 2 and additionally its profit from market 1. Obviously 
from A’s perspective B acts as a profit maximisation company in market 1. As a 
result  equation  (4)  which  describes  B’s  first  order  condition  regarding  its 
engagement in market 1 is still relevant in the welfare maximisation regime. 
However, we have to redefine A’s first order condition in such regime. Using the 
rule of Leibnitz we get: 12 
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Since  A  still  has  incentives  to  maximise  access  income  and  since  B  still 
maximise income from its engagement in market 1 the equations (5) and (6) 
still hold in a regime of welfare maximisation. However, in a system of access 
price  regulation,  equation  (4)  changes.  Again,  the  access  price  would  be 
exogenously given at  1 a . 
 
2.3 Strategic interactions 
 
After defining the model’s setting, the objective functions and the first order 
conditions  in  the  regime  of  profit  maximisation  on  the  one  side  and  welfare 
maximisation on the other side, we are able to analyse the strategic interactions 
between A and B. On the one side, we analyse the players’ strategic interactions 
regarding  their  quantity  decisions.  On  the  other  side,  we  analyse  their 
behaviour in case of exogenous access price shifts. The strategic interactions are 
analysed under the assumption of profit maximising and welfare maximising.  
  We firstly analyse A’s reaction function on an exogenous change of B’s 
engagement in market 1. For this reason we consider the profit maximisation 
regime. We can derive dq1A / dq1B by using the total differentiation of A’s first 
order condition, equation (3): 
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The right hand side of equation (10) tends to be negative. It is negative in case 
of a concave, linear or minor convex demand. It is only positive in case of a 
strong convex demand, where p1’’(q1) > 0 and p1’’(q1) q1A > -p1’(q1). We can derive 13 
A’s reaction to an exogenous change in B’s engagement analogously in a regime 
of welfare maximisation:  
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Now, the right hand side of equation (11) can be zero, positive or negative. It is 
zero in case of a linear demand. It is negative in case of a convex demand and it 
is  positive  in  case  of  concave  demand.  Note  that  the  linear  case  is  of  high 
interest  in  the  welfare  maximisation  regime,  since  it  is  exactly  the  boarder 
between a positive and a negative reaction on B’s reduced engagement.  
Obviously A’s incentives to reduce its own water production in case of an 
increased  engagement  of  B  tend  to  be  stronger  in  the  profit  maximisation 
regime than in the welfare maximisation regime. To illustrate this issue we can 
analyse the linear case. In the profit maximisation regime A reduces q1A when B 
increases q1B. Obviously the production quantities are strategic substitutes. The 
increased engagement of B reduces the relevant market price p1, as a result it is 
profit  maximising  for  A  to  answer  with  a  reduction  of  its  own  engagement. 
However,  in  the  welfare  maximisation  regime  A  would  not  change  its 
production quantity q1A when B increases q1B. Such behaviour reduces A’s profit 
but  it  increases  domestic  consumer  surplus  since  the  relevant  market  price 
decreases. Obviously welfare maximising is now a very strong commitment: the 
incumbent A sets its production quantity independent from B’s engagement in 
market 1. The welfare maximisation regime then corresponds to a Stackelberg 
duopoly, where A defines its capacities before B. An additional finding is the 
fact that changing A’s objective function reverses the sign of A’s reaction on a 
change of q1B. In the profit maximisation regime that uses a concave demand, A 
reduces  its  own  production  when  B  increases  q1B.  However,  in  the  welfare 
maximisation regime A increases q1A in case of a concave demand. 14 
After  defining  A’s  reaction  functions  in  the  profit  and  welfare 
maximising regimes, we turn to the player B’s strategic behaviour. However, 
since B always acts as a profit maximising company in market 1, we can reduce 
our analysis to one regime. We can derive dq1B / dq1A analogously as above: 
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The right hand side of equation (12) tends to be negative. It is negative in case 
of a concave, linear or minor convex demand. It is only positive in case of a 
strong  convex  demand,  where  p1’’(q1)  >  0  and  p1’’(q1)  q1A  >  -p1’(q1).  Not 
surprisingly  the  result  corresponds  to  A’s  reaction  function  in  the  regime  of 
profit maximisation.  
  We turn to the analysis regarding the player’s reactions on exogenous 
changes of the access price. Obviously such analysis is of higher relevance when 
the access price is determined by a separate regulation agency. In such case the 
access price is in fact exogenous from A’s and B’s point of view. B’s reaction on 
exogenous shifts in a1 is already determined by equation (6). The analysis can 
be focused on A’s reaction on an exogenous change of a1. Since a1 is set before A 
determines its production quantity q1A, we analyse the change of A’s optimal 
quantity setting given an exogenous change of a1. This is the evaluation of the 
second order partial derivative of A’s objective function at q1A = q1A*. Again, we 
firstly evaluate the profit maximising regime:4 
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4 Equation (13) shows, how the optimal choice q1A* changes when assuming an exogenous change of a1 at a 
given level of q1B. For this reason we differentiate A’s first order condition regarding q1A at q1A* with respect to 
a1. If the result is positive, one can follow that the peak of a function  ) ), ( ( 1 1 1 B A A q a q P  shifts to the right, to 
higher levels of q1A. 15 
In  order  to  determine  if  the  right  hand  side  of  equation  (13)  is  positive  or 
negative, we evaluate  1 1 / a q A ¶ ¶ . However, this relation must be zero, since for a 
given q1B A would not change its own q1A when a1 is increased or decreased 
exogenously.5 We can rewrite (13) as follows:  
 



























=       (14) 
 
Due to equation (6) we know that  0 / 1 1 < ¶ ¶ a q B . As a result the right hand side of 
(14) is positive in case of a linear or minor convex demand. As a result, A’s 
optimal  quantity  tends  to  increase  with  an  exogenously  increased  a1.  A’s 
reaction is only negative in case of a strong convex demand, where p1’’(q1) > 0 
and p1’’(q1) q1A > -p1’(q1). The result corresponds to the findings above: in case of 
a linear or minor convex demand A would increase q1A when B reduces its own 
production  quantity.  Since  0 / 1 1 < ¶ ¶ a q B   A  can  expect  that  B  reduces  its 
engagement q1B (for a given q1A), when a1 is exogenously increased. Similar to 
our analysis above we evaluate A’s reaction on an exogenous change of a1 in the 































=       (15)  
 
The right hand side of equation is zero in case of a linear demand. It is positive 
in case of a convex demand and negative in case of a concave demand. Again, 
the finding corresponds with the result above. And again, the linear case is of 
high interest in the welfare maximisation regime, since it is exactly the boarder 
between  a  positive  and  a  negative  reaction  on  the  exogenous  change  of  the 
access  price.  In  case  of  a  linear  demand,  A  does  not  change  its  optimal 
production quantity when a1 is exogenously increased. Indeed B faces incentives 
                                                            
5 The same result can be derived by using the total differentiation of A’s first order condition.  16 
to  reduce  its  engagement  in  market  1  A  does  not  change  its  optimal  q1A. 
According to equation (11), A would not answer the reduced q1B.  
 
 




In section 2.3 we analysed the strategic interactions between the incumbent A 
and the market entrant B for given governance structures. We used a general 
demand function that allows us to evaluate these interactions in detail. We can 
show that varying the governance structure significantly changes the strategic 
interaction  between  A  and  B.  However,  up  to  now  A  did  not  choose  its 
governance  structure  strategically.  Obviously  such  decision  requires  more 
detailed information about the effects on profit and welfare. In this section we 
extend the analysis to stage 0 of our model, where the incumbent chooses its 
governance structure strategically. Since the general demand function does not 
allow us to evaluate and to compare profits and welfare in the two regimes, we 
use a simple linear demand function. The use of linearity is very common in the 
literature of mixed oligopolies, since it allows an explicit evaluation of A’s profit 
and welfare in market 1 in different regimes. We follow de Fraja and Delbono 
(1989, p. 304) or Pal and White (1998, p. 266) and define the inverse demand as 
follows:  
 
B A bq bq k bq k p 1 1 1 1 - - = - =       (16), 
 
where  k  stands  for  the  reservation  price  and  b  determines  the  demand 
elasticity. Similar to the general analysis we assume a more efficient supplier 
B.  To  ease  the  analysis  we  assume  linear  cost  functions  for  both  utilities, 
whereby k > cA > cB. In the following sections we determine short run variables 
such as production quantities q1A and q1B, retail price p1 and access price a1 17 
under the assumption of profit or welfare maximisation. Using these variables 
allows the calculation of A’s profit and welfare in market 1. The comparison of 
welfare in profit in the two regimes allows A to decide about its governance 
structure  in  period  0.  As  showed  above,  at  stage  0  there  is  no  strategic 
interaction  with  player  B,  since  from  A’s  point  of  view  B  always  acts  profit 
maximising.  The  proposed  procedure  implies  that  profit  maximisation  not 
necessarily  maximises  A’s  profit  and  welfare  maximisation  not  necessarily 
welfare in market 1.  
 
3.2 Unregulated Access 
 
In order to analyse and compare the two different regimes, we have to calculate 
the quantities, prices, profit, consumer surplus and welfare explicitly. In order 
to differentiate the regimes, we add the index π in case of profit maximisation 
and the index θ in case of welfare maximisation. First, let us determine the 
model’s results in a regime of profit maximisation. Using equation (15) in (3), 
(4), (5) and (6) allows to determine the player’s production quantities for market 
1, the retail price and the relevant access price. The results are illustrated in 
Table 2. Using these equations we can determine A’s profit on the one side and 
consumer surplus in market 1 on the other side, whereby consumer surplus can 
be  calculated  as  follows: 
p p p
1 1 1 ) ( 5 . 0 q p k CS - = .  The  results  are  illustrated  in 
Table 3. Adding A’s profit and consumer surplus allows us to determine welfare 
in a regime of profit maximisation:  
 
b
c c c c kc kc k
W
B A B A B A
24
5 12 8 2 16 9
2 2 2
1
+ + - - -
=
p       if       0 1 >
p
A q        (17) 
 
Note  that  the  analysis  above  assumes  q1A  >  0.  However,  such  assumption 
requires that the efficiency difference between A and B is not too high and / or 
the  reservation  price  k  is  high  enough.  Only  in  such  case,  the  less  efficient 
incumbent faces positive production incentives. However, A stops its own water 












Now, it is profit maximising for the incumbent A to stop its own production. 
However, the relevant income loss can be compensated by charging the access 
fee.  Utility  B  is  then  the  sole  supplier  in  market  1.  Obviously  B  acts  as  a 
monopolist. However, its relevant marginal costs are determined by the own 
marginal  production  costs  cB  and  the  access  price  a1  charged  by  A.  B’s 
production quantity and the resulting market price can be determined similar 
to  the  monopoly  case  (see  Table  2).  A’s  profit  is  now  determined  by  the 
multiplication  of  the  access  price  with  B’s  engagement  in  market  one.  In 
equilibrium such access price does not differ from the access price in the profit 
maximisation regime, where both utilities produce a positive amount of water 
(see Table 2). Table 3 shows A’s profit and the relevant consumer surplus in 













p       (18)      if       0 1 =
p
A q  
 
The above derived results from the profit maximisation regime can be compared 
with  the  welfare  maximisation  regime,  where  the  incumbent  utility  A 
maximises welfare rather than profit. Again, we firstly assume, that A decides 
to produce a positive amount of water, q1A > 0. The player’s decisions at stage 3 
of the model can be determined by using equation (16) and the equations (4), 
(5), (6) and (9). Again, the relevant production quantities, the retail price and 
the access price are illustrated by Table 2. From equation (11) in section 2.3 we 
know, that in the linear demand case A does not change its own production 
quantity  when  B  increases  or  reduces  its  engagement,  dq1A  /  dq1B  =  0.  This 
finding obviously corresponds with 
q










1       (19) 
 
Such  behaviour  can  be  interpreted  as  a  very  strong  commitment,  where  A 
decides  about  its  production  quantity  independently  from  B’s  engagement  in 
market  1.  The  relevant  consumer  surplus  and  A’s  profit  in  a  profit 
maximisation regime where both utilities produce a positive amount of water 
are illustrated in Table 3. Now, we can derive the welfare in such regime:  
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Again,  A  might  decide  to  stop  the  own  production.  However,  according  to 
equation (19) A produces a positive amount of water if the reservation price 




A q      if      A c k >  
With  other  words:  A  stops  the  own  production  if  marginal  costs  equal  the 
reservation price. But we assumed that such reservation price k always exceeds 
marginal  costs  of  A  and  B  –  otherwise  A  did  not  run  the  monopoly  before 
introducing common carriage competition. We can follow, that A faces always 
production incentives in the welfare maximisation regime. However, such result 
does  not  hold  for  the  more  efficient  utility  B.  Obviously  in  the  profit 
maximisation  regime,  B  always  faces  positive  production  incentives  when 
B A c c >  – see Table 2. In the welfare maximisation regime B is only engaged in 
market 1, if the market price p1 exceeds its relevant costs cB + a1. Or: B stops its 
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At high levels of cB or low levels of cA utility B decides to leave market 1. Such 
behaviour can be explained as follows: At relatively low levels of cA B can expect 
a high engagement of its competitor A. As a result the retail price in market 1 
tends to be low. B skips its engagement when the retail price falls under its 
relevant marginal costs. Now, the incumbent A is the sole supplier in market 1. 
Welfare maximisation requires in such situation the equalisation of marginal 
costs  and  retail  price:  A c p =
q
1 .  Again,  Table  2  illustrates  the  production 
quantity in such regime and Table 3 the resulting profit and consumer surplus. 
Obviously A does not generate any profit, since the retail price equals marginal 
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After defining quantities, prices, profit and welfare in each situation of the two 
regimes, we can compare them. Obviously we have to compare three different 
cases.  In  a  case  1  A’s  marginal  costs  are  high.  As  a  result,  in  the  profit 
maximisation  regime  the  less  efficient  incumbent  decides  to  stop  the  own 
production. However, in the welfare maximisation regime A still has production 
incentives.  In  case  2  A’s  marginal  costs  are  lower  than  in  case  1.  In  both 
regimes the less efficient incumbent produces a positive amount of water. In 
case 3 A’s marginal costs are relatively low but still higher than its competitor’s 
costs.  In  the  profit  maximisation  regime  both  utilities  produce  a  positive 
amount  of  water  for  customers  in  market  1.  However,  in  the  welfare 
maximisation  regime  B  stops  the  own  production,  since  the  retail  price  p1 
exceeds its relevant costs. Table 1 illustrates these cases.  
 21 
 



























Profit maximisation regime  q1A = 0; q1B > 0  q1A > 0; q1B > 0  q1A > 0; q1B > 0 
Welfare maximisation regime  q1A > 0; q1B > 0  q1A > 0; q1B > 0  q1A > 0; q1B = 0 
Table 1: Cases to compare 
 
Using  the  above  derived  results  (see  Table  2)  we  can  illustrate 
aggregated water supply respectively the utilities’ production incentives in the 
three relevant cases graphically. Figure 2 shows aggregated water supply in 
market  1  under  a  profit  maximisation  regime  (q1П)  and  under  a  welfare 
maximisation regime (q1θ)6. Additionally it shows the amount of water sold by 














Figure 2 : Production quantities 
 
                                                            










+ B c k
A B c c < = 01 . 0


























+ B c k
A B c c < = 01 . 0





















Figure 2 shows that aggregated production is higher under the welfare 
maximisation regime. However, B’s production incentives tend to be higher in 
the  profit  maximisation  regime.  Under  the  welfare  maximisation  regime  the 
more efficient utility B only produces in cases 1 and 2. Now, we can turn to the 
comparison of welfare. 
 
Case 1 compares the profit maximisation regime, where only the more 
efficient  utility  B,  produces  a  positive  amount  of  water,  with  the  welfare 
maximisation regime where both utilities are engaged in market 1. First we 
compare A’s profit in these two regimes:  
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One can show for any values of k, cA and cB and b that the right hand side of 
equation (22) is negative. As a result, A’s profit in case 1 is higher in the profit 
maximisation regime. From Table 3 we know, that consumer surplus is higher 
in  the  welfare  maximisation  regime,  since  A c k k 2 3 - < .  And  the  welfare 
difference is defined as follows: 
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Considering  4 / ) 3 ( B A c k c + ³   for  case  1  we  can  show  that  such  difference  is 
negative for any values of k, cA and cB and b. That means, welfare is higher in a 
regime of profit maximisation. Such result seems to be very puzzling, since the 
regime  of  profit  maximisation  generates  higher  welfare  than  welfare 
maximisation. Such effect can be explained by a profit-overcompensation-effect. 
Obviously in the regime of profit maximisation A generates higher profit than 
in  the  welfare  maximisation  regime,  but  consumer  surplus  is  higher  in  the 
welfare maximisation regime. However, the additional domestic profit in the 
profit maximisation regime arising from the access business overcompensates 23 
for  the  disadvantage  regarding  domestic  consumer  surplus.  The  net  effect  is 
positive:  welfare  tends  to  be  higher  in  the  profit  maximisation  regime.  The 
rational  behind  is  obvious:  A’s  profit  is  higher  due  to  the  higher  production 
efficiency in market 1. Since the less efficient supplier A stops own production, 
the  overall  production  efficiency  can  be  improved.  However,  the  welfare 
difference decreases with higher levels of cA or lower levels of cB. In such case, 
welfare  maximisation  gets  relatively  more  attractive,  since  B  increases  its 
engagement in market 1 in case of lower levels of cB, and A reduces its own 
engagement in case of higher levels of cA. 
 
Case 2 compares profit and welfare maximisation under the assumption 
that both utilities are engaged in market 1. From our results in Table 1 we 
know  that  A determines the access price at  the same level in both regimes. 
Additionally  we  know  that  A’s  engagement  in  the  regime  of  welfare 
maximisation is higher than under profit maximisation: 
q p
A A q q 1 1 < . However, B’s 
engagement is lower in case of welfare maximisation. Such result is not very 
surprising,  since  we  know  from  equation  (12)  that  B  reduces  its  own 
engagement at higher levels of q1A. Nevertheless, the net effect regarding the 
total  amount  of  sold  water  in  market  1  is  still  positive.  In  the  welfare 
maximisation regime total quantity q1 is higher than in the profit maximisation 
regime. Hence, the resulting retail price in market 1 is lower in the welfare 
maximisation regime. Again, up to this point the result is not surprising, since 
welfare  maximisation  increases  the  amount  of  sold  quantity  and  it  reduces 
prices. Consumer surplus must be higher in the welfare maximisation regime. 
In fact Table 2 shows that 
q p
1 1 CS CS < . Introducing welfare maximisation into 
the model increases consumer surplus in market 1. However, as stated above 
the increased engagement of A in a welfare maximisation regime reduces the 
engagement  of  B  in  market  1.  Such  crowding  out  effect  directly  affects  A’s 
profit, since it reduces A’s income from the access business. 24 
  A’s engagement  B’s engagement  Total quantity  Retail price  Access price 
Cases 2 and 3: Cases 2 and 3: Cases 2 and 3: Cases 2 and 3: Profit maximisation 












































Case 1: Case 1: Case 1: Case 1: Profit maximisation regime 
(A stops own production) 
0 1 =
p


































           
Cases 1 and 2: Cases 1 and 2: Cases 1 and 2: Cases 1 and 2: Welfare  













































Case 3: Case 3: Case 3: Case 3: Welfare maximisation 
regime (B stops production for 
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Table 2: Quantities, retail price and access price 
 
  A’s profit  Consumer surplus in market 1 
Cases 2 and 3: Cases 2 and 3: Cases 2 and 3: Cases 2 and 3: Profit maximisation 
regime (A and B produce)  b
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Case 3: Case 3: Case 3: Case 3: Welfare maximisation 
















Table 3: Profit and consumer surplus 25 
We can show, that  A’s profit in  the welfare maximisation regime is lower than 
under profit maximisation for any values of k, cA and cB and b: 
q p
A A 1 1 P > P  (see Table 
3). However, we should determine the net effect regarding social welfare. Welfare 
in  the  regime  of  welfare  maximisation  profits  from  a  higher  consumer  surplus. 
Welfare in the regime of profit maximisation profits from a higher domestic profit. 
Equation (24) compares welfare in these two regimes:  
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Under the restriction  4 / ) 3 ( 2 / ) ( B A B c k c c k + < < +  we can show that the right hand 
side of equation (24) is always negative. Welfare is higher in a regime of profit 
maximisation. The welfare difference is higher at lower levels of k and/or lower cost 
differentials. Obviously higher levels of k increase A’s engagement in market 1. 
However, B’s engagement is not affected by k in the profit maximising regime (see 
Table 2). Higher levels of k increase A’s engagement more significant in the regime 
of welfare maximisation, B on the other side reduces its own engagement as an 
answer – which supports A’s quantity enhancement. Welfare is positively affected 
by a higher overall quantity but negatively affected by lower profits due to lower 
production  efficiency.  Since  the  effect  regarding  consumer  surplus  dominates  a 
higher level of k increases welfare in the welfare maximisation regime relatively. 
As stated above, lower levels of cB at unchanged levels of cA reduce welfare in the 
welfare maximisation regime relatively. We can illustrate this issue by reducing 
the  level  of  cB.  In  the  welfare  maximisation  regime  A  does  not  change  its  own 
production  volume.  Due  to  this  strong  commitment  B  increases  its  own 
engagement less significant than in a profit maximisation regime, where A reduces 
its  own  production  quantity  at  lower  levels  of  cB.  As  a  result  the  additional 
consumer  surplus  in  the  welfare  maximisation  regime  is  only  of  second  order. 
However, the effect regarding access price income is of first order: in the profit 
maximisation  regime  access  price  income  can  be  increased  stronger.  We  can 
summarise that welfare is higher in a profit maximisation regime since A’s higher 
profit overcompensates for lower consumer surplus.  26 
Case 3 compares profit maximisation where both utilities are engaged in 
market 1 with welfare maximisation where only the less efficient utility is engaged 
in  market  1.  In  this  case  A’s  marginal  costs  are  relatively  low.  As  a  result  A’s 
engagement is higher than in the other cases. But A’s extended engagement lowers 
the equilibrium retail price and therefore B’s incentives to engage in market 1. In 
the  welfare  maximisation  regime  B  skips  its  engagement  in  market  1,  only  A 
supplies customers connected to network 1. In order to maximise welfare, A sets 
A c p =
q
1 . From the relevant equations in Table 2 and the assumption  2 / ) ( B A c k c + £  
one  can  easily  show  that  such  price  is  lower  than  the  equilibrium  price  in  the 
welfare maximisation regime. As a result, total quantity of water sold in market 1 
in  the  welfare  maximisation  regime  exceeds  the  total  quantity  in  the  profit 
maximisation  regime.  Since  A’s  does  not  generate  any  profit  in  the  welfare 
maximisation regime, we can follow that consumer surplus in such regime exceeds 
consumer  surplus  in  a  regime  of  profit  maximisation.  Again,  we  compare  the 
relevant welfare in these two regimes:  
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Again,  we  consider  2 / ) ( B A c k c + £ .  The  right  hand  side  of  equation  (24)  can  be 
positive or negative. It tends to be positive at higher levels of k and/or lower levels 
of  cA.  Obviously  in  such  case  A produces  relatively  more  efficient,  the  resulting 
consumer surplus tends to be higher and can overcompensate for non-profit. Such 
result basically corresponds to a result derived by de Fraja and Delbono (1989). 
They  show  that  nationalisation  (a  public  monopoly  that  maximises  welfare)  is 
socially  always  better  than  Stackelberg  leadership  of  the  public  company  in  a 
competitive  environment  under  profit  maximisation.  In  their  model  additional 
profit can not compensate for lower consumer surplus. However, they assume that 
the  players  face  similar  costs.  In  our  model  the  player  face  different  marginal 
treatment  costs.  At  higher  levels  of  cA,  but  still  2 / ) ( B A c k c + £ ,  the  profit 
maximisation gets relatively more attractive regarding social welfare. Obviously 27 
overall  production  efficiency  is  higher  in  the  profit  maximisation  regime.  Profit 
compensates now for a lower consumer surplus. 
The  welfare  in  these  three  cases  can  be  illustrated  graphically.  The 
horizontal axis in Figure 3 defines A’s marginal costs. Holding B’s marginal costs 
















Figure 3 : Welfare comparison 
 
 
In  case  1  the  welfare  in  the  profit  maximisation  regime  is  higher  than  in  the 
welfare maximisation regime. However, the difference is lower at higher levels of 
cA.  Obviously  Wπ  is  unaffected  from  cA.  From  equation  (18)  we  know  that 
0 / = ¶ ¶ A c W
p . However,  A c W ¶ ¶ /
q  can be positive or negative.8 At higher levels of cA 
it tends to be positive. In case 2 both  A c W ¶ ¶ /
q  and  A c W ¶ ¶ /
p  can be positive or 
negative.  They  are  positive  at  higher  levels  of  cA  and  negative  in  case  of  lower 
                                                            
7 Again, in the graphic the variables k and b are held constant at a level of 1. B’s marginal costs are assumed to be 
0.01.  
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levels of cA.9 In case 3 both  A c W ¶ ¶ /
q  and  A c W ¶ ¶ /
p  are negative.10 Note that the 
absolute value of the welfare in the welfare maximisation regime is not continuous. 
In case 3 the incumbent does not care about B since B does not have any incentives 
to enter the market. In cases 2 and 1 A takes B’s behaviour into account. 
We can show that the absolute gap between welfare in the profit and the 
welfare maximisation regime is decreasing at higher levels of b. From equations 
(23), (24) and (25) we know that the absolute gap is lower at higher levels of b. The 
reason for this is obvious, since higher levels of b at constant levels of k reduce 
consumer surplus and profit. At very high levels of b welfare converges to zero in 
both regimes. However, it is easily to show that the relative gap (welfare in the 
welfare  maximisation  regime  as  a  percentage  of  the  welfare  in  the  profit 
maximisation regime) does not change with an increased or reduced level of b.11 
However, higher levels of the consumer’s reservation price k increase both, welfare 
in the profit and the welfare maximisation regime. But the relative performance 
may change. Increasing levels of k enhance the relative performance of the welfare 
maximisation regime: the increased k reduces profit but increases consumer rent 
more significant – the net effect is positive. Additionally the net effect is stronger 
than the additional welfare gain in the profit maximisation regime. Nevertheless, 
when taking the cases’ cost restrictions into account, welfare in cases 2 and 3 is 
always higher in the profit maximisation regime.12 
 
                                                            
9  ) 72 24 48 )( 72 / 1 ( / A B A c c k b c W + - - = ¶ ¶
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J  
11 From equations (17), (18), (20) and (21) we know that a ten percent increase in b reduces welfare in each 
equation by ten percent.  
12 One can show this relations by differentiating the relevant welfare functions regarding the variable k and 
considering the cost restrictions (regarding cA and cB) in Table 1. 29 
3.3 Regulated access – an extension 
 
The section above assumed the absence of any access price regulation. A is fully 
free to set any level of a1. But the introduction of competition by third party access 
in  network  industries  such  as  telecommunications,  railways,  gas  or  electricity 
usually  assumes  some  kind  of  access  price  regulation.  However,  the  relevant 
network  costs  in  local  and  decentralised  water  networks  vary  significantly  (see 
section 2.1), an effective access price regulation tends to be difficult and expensive. 
Nevertheless, in this section we extend the model by the introduction of effective 
regulation. Traditional regulation theory suggests marginal cost pricing for access 
in order to maximise welfare. Since such a pricing regime describes a first best 
solution we use it as a benchmark. In our model we assumed no marginal costs of 
water transport and allocation. The regulator should therefore set a1 = 0. Again we 
analyse the effects of B’s entrance in market 1. Since B does not face any marginal 
costs  of  using  network  1,  the  problem  of  double  marginalisation  is  removed. 
Competition  in  network  1  can  be  described  as  an  ordinary  Cournot  duopoly 
competition model. In order to keep this analysis simple, we assume k = b = 1. 
Now, we can easily derive quantities and retail price in the profit maximisation 
regime.  Again,  we  have  to  consider  that  in  the  regulated  profit  maximisation 
regime A stops the own production when  2 / ) 1 ( B A c c + ³ . Again, we differentiate two 
different  cases  in  order  to  compare  the  two  regimes  (see  Table  4).  In  order  to 
differentiate the cases from above, we call them case R.1 and R.2. 
 
 
















Regulated profit maximisation 
regime 
q1A = 0; q1B > 0  q1A > 0; q1B > 0 
Regulated welfare maximisation 
regime 
q1A > 0; q1B > 0  q1A > 0; q1B > 0 
Table 4: Relevant cases 30 
 
 
First, we evaluate case R.1, where A stops the own production in the regulated 
profit  maximisation  regime  when  its  marginal  costs  exceed  (1+cB)/2.  Due  to  A’s 
reduced  engagement  the  total  amount  of  sold  water  is  higher  in  the  regulated 
welfare maximisation regime (see Table 5). As a result the retail price is lower and 
the  consumer  surplus  higher  in  the  regulated  welfare  maximisation  regime. 
However, profit in the regulated welfare maximisation regime is always negative 
(see Table 6), since  A c < 1  and  A B c c <  Again, we analyse the net effect regarding 
social welfare. Social welfare in the regulated profit maximisation regime is defined 










p       (26) 
 
It corresponds to the consumer surplus in market 1, since A’s profit is zero. And in 
the regulated welfare maximisation regime welfare is defined as follows: 
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At a sufficient high level of cB welfare tends to be higher in the profit maximisation 
regime.  In  such  case,  the  additional  consumer  surplus  in  the  regulated  welfare 
maximisation regime can not compensate for A’s loss. Of course higher welfare in 
the  profit  maximisation  regime  is  basically  a  result  of  the  higher  production 
efficiency – similar to the findings in 3.2. However, at lower levels of cA such loss 
can be overcompensated by the additional consumer surplus: at lower levels of cA 
welfare  tends  to  be  higher  in  the  regulated  welfare  maximisation  regime. 
Obviously the efficiency effect gets less relevant at lower levels of cA. 
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  A’s engagement  B’s engagement  Total quantity  Retail price 







































p   
Case R1: Case R1: Case R1: Case R1: 
Regulated profit 
maximisation 






























p   






























Table 5: Quantities and retail price 
 
  A’s profit  Consumer surplus in market 1 
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Table 6: Profit and consumer surplus 
 
 
In  case  R.2  both  utilities  produce  a  positive  amount  of  water  since  A’s 
marginal costs are lower than (1+cB)/2. Again, the total amount of water sold in 
market 1 is higher in the regime of regulated welfare maximisation. As a result the 
retail price in market 1 is lower in the welfare maximisation regime. And again, 
one can follow, that consumer surplus must be higher under welfare maximisation. 
And  similar  to  case  R.1  A  always  suffers  a  loss  in  the  regulated  welfare 
maximisation regime. Social welfare in the regulated welfare maximisation regime 
is  defined  similar  to  equation  (27).  However,  welfare  in  the  regulated  profit 
maximisation regime is now defined as follows:  32 
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We can easily show that the difference between equations (27) and (28) defined as 
p q
1 1 W W -   is  always  positive  when  assuming  1 < < A B c c .  As  a  result,  in  case  R.2 
welfare is always higher in the welfare maximisation regime. Again, the effect of a 
higher  consumer  surplus  is  stronger  than  the  negative  impact  of  A’s  loss.  The 
higher production efficiency in the profit maximisation regime can not compensate 
for lower prices. Additionally, in contrast to the unregulated regimes, welfare in 
market 1 does not directly profit from B’s engagement through the access price 
income. As a result the effect of a higher consumer surplus is even more dominant.  
 
3.4 Comparing the regimes – a simulation  
 
One may ask if from a welfare maximisation point of view it is useful to introduce 
any kind of access price regulation. For this reason, we compare equations (26) and 
(27) from the regulated regimes with equations (17), (18), (20) and (21) from the 
unregulated  regimes.  Again,  we  consider  the  different  cases  when  assuming 
different  cA.  To  ease  the  analysis,  we  compare  the  regimes  by  using  a  simple 
simulation where k = b = 1 ,  1 < < A B c c  , cB = 0.01. 
The simulation (see Table 7) clearly shows that overall welfare decreases 
with higher levels of cA. In the unregulated case welfare tends to be higher under 
profit maximisation, except for low levels of cA (case 3). However, consumer surplus 
is always higher in the regime of welfare maximisation. In the unregulated case 
welfare tends to be higher in the profit maximisation regime only for higher levels 
of cA (case R.1). Consumer surplus is always higher in the welfare maximisation 
regime.  Additionally,  welfare  can  be  higher  or  lower  under  the  assumption  of 
regulation  or  non-regulation.  At  lower  levels  of  cA  welfare  is  the  highest  in  the 
unregulated  and  regulated  welfare  maximisation  regime.  At  higher  levels  of  cA 
welfare tends to be the highest in an unregulated profit maximisation regime.  
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  Unregulated regime Unregulated regime Unregulated regime Unregulated regime        Regulated regime Regulated regime Regulated regime Regulated regime       
  Consumer Surplus  Welfare  Consumer Surplus  Welfare 
cA  CS1π  CS1θ  W1π  W1θ  CS1π  CS1θ  W1π  W1θ 
0.10  0.11  0.41  0.31  0.41  0.20  0.45  0.27  0.41 
0.15  0.10  0.36  0.28  0.36  0.19  0.42  0.24  0.36 
0.20  0.09  0.32  0.26  0.32  0.18  0.40  0.22  0.32 
0.25  0.09  0.28  0.24  0.28  0.17  0.38  0.20  0.29 
0.30  0.08  0.25  0.22  0.25  0.16  0.36  0.18  0.26 
0.35  0.07  0.21  0.20  0.21  0.15  0.34  0.16  0.23 
0.40  0.07  0.18  0.19  0.18  0.14  0.32  0.15  0.20 
0.45  0.06  0.15  0.17  0.15  0.13  0.30  0.13  0.18 
0.50  0.06  0.13  0.16  0.13  0.12  0.28  0.12  0.16 
0.55  0.05  0.11  0.16  0.11  0.12  0.26  0.12  0.14 
0.60  0.04  0.10  0.15  0.10  0.12  0.24  0.12  0.12 
0.65  0.04  0.09  0.15  0.10  0.12  0.22  0.12  0.11 
0.70  0.04  0.08  0.15  0.10  0.12  0.21  0.12  0.10 
0.75  0.03  0.07  0.15  0.10  0.12  0.19  0.12  0.10 
0.80  0.03  0.06  0.17  0.15  0.12  0.18  0.12  0.10 
0.85  0.03  0.05  0.18  0.15  0.12  0.16  0.12  0.10 
0.90  0.03  0.04  0.19  0.15  0.12  0.15  0.12  0.10 
0.95  0.03  0.04  0.20  0.15  0.12  0.14  0.12  0.11 
0.99  0.03  0.03  0.22  0.15  0.12  0.13  0.12  0.12 






Using a competition model of common carriage in the water industry we can show 
that social welfare can be higher in a regime of profit maximisation. We follow that 
from a welfare maximisation perspective it might be suboptimal for a municipality 
to instruct its utility to maximise welfare instead of profit. According to the model’s 
results welfare tends to be higher in a profit maximisation regime when assuming 
higher  efficiency  differentials  between  the  incumbent  A  and  the  entering  water 34 
supplier  B.  Only  at  very  low  efficiency  differentials  welfare  maximisation  may 
generate a higher level of welfare. The reason is obvious. In a welfare maximisation 
regime  the  incumbent  acts  like  a  Stackelberg  leader  and  announces  a  hard 
commitment about its production quantity due to its objective function. We can 
easily  show  that  the  optimal  production  quantity  exceeds  optimal  production 
quantity in a profit maximisation regime. Since the profit maximising firm B has a 
downward sloping reaction curve, B reduces its own engagement when A commits a 
higher level of engagement in market 1 – obviously the higher engagement of A 
reduces  prices  and  therefore  potential  benefits  in  market  1.  Since  the  overall 
production  quantity  tends  to  be  higher  in  the  welfare  maximisation  regime, 
consumer surplus is also higher. However, the incumbent faces a lower profit due 
to the lower retail price on the one side and due to lower access income incurred by 
B’s  reduced  engagement  on  the  other  side.  The  lower  consumer  surplus  in  the 
profit maximisation regime is overcompensated by A’s higher profit. The net effect 
is  positive:  welfare  tends  to  be  higher  under  profit  maximisation.  Additionally 
production  efficiency  is  higher  in  such  regime,  since  the  more  efficient  B’s 
engagement is higher in market 1. Due to the higher efficiency we expect higher 
overall profits – A benefits from the higher overall profits by charging the access 
fee. 
By  the  introduction  of  effective  access  price  regulation  the  degree  of 
competition in the market can be enhanced. However, welfare in municipality 1 
does not necessarily benefits from such regulation, since it allows B to skim more of 
the aggregated profit. However, now the retail price tends to be the lowest and the 
consumer surplus the highest in the regime of welfare maximisation – expect for 
very high levels of cA, where A decides to quit and B acts as a pure monopolist. 
However, only when assuming very low cost differentials, where A can act as a 
competitive firm, welfare can be the highest in a regulated welfare maximisation 
regime.  At  higher  levels  of  efficiency  differentials  A  looses  market  share  and 
therefore  profit.  Domestic  welfare  is  only  determined  by  consumer  surplus. 
However,  in  practice  the  regulation  of  access  prices  in  the  decentralised  water 
sector  tends  to  be  very  difficult.  We  can  assume  that  the  incumbent  faces 
significant freedom to determine or to influence access prices.  35 
The  model  basically  extends  existing  mixed  oligopoly  models  by  the 
introduction  of  the  network  interconnection  and  therefore  by  the  access  price 
business.  Obviously  such  extensions  slightly  alter  the  results  of  the  existing 
models. De Fraja and Delbono (1989) for instance follow from their analysis that 
nationalisation  (one  public  welfare  maximising  monopoly)  is  always  better  than 
Stackelberg  leadership  which  is  in  turn  socially  better  than  Cournot  Nash 
behaviour.  However,  they  assume  that  the  involved  firms  have  the  same 
technology.  Nevertheless,  De  Fraja  and  Delbono  show  that  under  certain 
circumstances  (large  number  of  firms)  welfare  tends  to  be  higher  in  a  profit 
maximisation regime, since the higher consumer surplus in a welfare maximisation 
regime  is  not  high  enough  to  compensate  the  lower  private  profits.  Such  result 
strongly resembles to the results derived in the model above.  
Finally one might concern that the model is still very general, even when it 
is applied in the piped water market. Of course one could image to apply the same 
interconnection model in another local network industry, for instance waste water. 
Results  might  be  similar.  The  model  could  be  extended  by  allowing  for  cross 
boarder trade between the neighboured water utilities. Such extension was made 
by  Foellmi  and  Meister  (2004).  We  might  analyse  the  effects  of  a  changed 
governance  structure  when  utilities  rather  trade  water  resources  than  compete 
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